Abstract We study social efficiency of entry in the presence of downstream cost asymmetry and upstream price discrimination. We show that entry is excessive when the entrants are highly inefficient, and it is insufficient when either the entrants are efficient or their inefficiency is low. The results are in sharp contrast to the existing literature considering upstream uniform pricing (Cao, H., and L. F. S. Wang. 2020. “Social Efficiency of Entry in a Vertically Related Industry Revisited.” Economics Letters 129. Art. no. 109200), as discriminatory pricing alters the relative strengths of the business-stealing, business-creation and production-(in)efficiency effects.

中文翻译：

---

三级价格歧视垂直结构中进入的社会效率

摘要 我们研究了在存在下游成本不对称和上游价格歧视的情况下进入的社会效率。我们表明，当进入者效率非常低时进入过度，而当进入者有效率或低效率时进入不足。结果与考虑上游统一定价的现有文献形成鲜明对比（Cao, H. 和 LFS Wang。2020。“重新审视垂直相关行业中进入的社会效率。”经济学快报 129。艺术编号 109200），因为歧视性定价改变了商业窃取、商业创造和生产（无效）效率效应的相对强度。