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The Mechanics of Individually- and Socially-Optimal Decisions during an Epidemic
The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics ( IF 0.233 ) Pub Date : 2021-09-14 , DOI: 10.1515/bejm-2021-0072
Guillaume Vandenbroucke 1
Affiliation  

Abstract I present a model where work implies social interactions and the spread of a disease is described by an SIR-type framework. Upon the outbreak of a disease reduced social contacts are decided at the cost of lower consumption. Private individuals do not internalize the effects of their decisions on the evolution of the epidemic while the planner does. Specifically, the planner internalizes that an early reduction in contacts implies fewer infectious in the future and, therefore, a lower risk of infection. This additional (relative to private individuals) benefit of reduced contacts implies that the planner’s solution feature more social distancing early in the epidemics. The planner also internalizes that some infectious eventually recover and contribute further to a lower risk of infection. These mechanisms imply that the planner obtains a flatter infection curve than that generated by private individuals’ responses.

中文翻译:

流行病期间个人和社会最优决策的机制

摘要我提出了一个模型,其中工作意味着社会互动,疾病的传播由 SIR 型框架描述。疾病爆发后,社会接触的减少是以降低消费为代价的。个人不会内化他们的决定对流行病演变的影响,而规划者会内化。具体来说,计划者将早期接触减少意味着未来的传染性降低,因此感染风险降低。减少接触的这种额外(相对于个人)好处意味着计划者的解决方案在流行病早期具有更大的社会距离。计划者还内化了一些传染性最终会恢复并进一步降低感染风险的因素。
更新日期:2021-09-14
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