Abstract I study the origins of the market for corporate charters and the emergence of Delaware as the leader of this market. Specifically, I assemble new data on 19th- and 20th-century corporations to evaluate two widely held beliefs: (1) the U.S. Supreme Court is responsible for enabling a national market for corporate charters in the 19th century and (2) Delaware became the leader in this market only because New Jersey (the initial leader) repealed its extremely liberal corporate laws in 1913. I argue against both claims: The Supreme Court always opposed a national market for corporate charters, and New Jersey’s decline began a decade before its 1913 repeal. It is more likely that the market for corporate charters emerged as a collateral consequence of interstate commerce and that New Jersey declined because Delaware and other states simply copied its laws.

中文翻译：

---

公司法市场的起源

摘要 我研究了公司章程市场的起源以及特拉华州作为该市场领导者的出现。具体来说，我收集了有关 19 世纪和 20 世纪公司的新数据，以评估两个广泛持有的信念：（1）美国最高法院负责为 19 世纪的公司章程建立全国市场；（2）特拉华州成为领导者之所以进入这个市场，只是因为新泽西州（最初的领导者）在 1913 年废除了其极其自由的公司法。我反对这两种说法：最高法院一直反对公司章程的全国市场，新泽西州的衰落始于 1913 年废除前十年.