Abstract Repressive policies to fight criminal organizations are often met with a violent response from criminal groups. Are non-repressive strategies more effective? Targeting criminal revenues can be a powerful tool if the threat of investigation is credible and if criminals are unable to displace their activity to avoid controls. We study an Italian policy designed to tackle mafia misappropriation of public funds by screening companies applying for subsidies over 150,000 Euros. Using all subsidies to firms co-financed by the European Union from 2008 to 2015, we find that a group of firms starts self-selecting below the threshold immediately after its introduction. Those firms are concentrated in mafia-affected cities, are lower performing, operate in typical mafia sectors, and have balance sheet indicators of money laundering. While avoiding violence, non-repressive strategies might have different unintended consequences: criminal organizations react with an immediate strategic displacement which reduces states’ capacity to detect them, highlighting the importance of designing policies that anticipate the sophistication of criminal organizations. (JEL H00, D72).

中文翻译：

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以收入为目标打击有组织犯罪：筛查、黑手党和公共资金

摘要 打击犯罪组织的镇压政策常常遭到犯罪集团的暴力回应。非压制性策略更有效吗？如果调查的威胁是可信的，并且犯罪分子无法转移他们的活动以逃避控制，那么瞄准犯罪收入可能是一个强大的工具。我们研究了意大利一项旨在通过筛选申请超过 150,000 欧元补贴的公司来解决黑手党挪用公共资金的政策。使用 2008 年至 2015 年对欧盟共同资助的公司的所有补贴，我们发现一组公司在引入阈值后立即开始自我选择。这些公司集中在受黑手党影响的城市，业绩较差，在典型的黑手党部门开展业务，并具有洗钱的资产负债表指标。在避免暴力的同时，非压制性策略可能会产生不同的意想不到的后果：犯罪组织会立即采取战略性转移行动，这会降低国家发现它们的能力，这凸显了设计预测犯罪组织复杂性的政策的重要性。(JEL H00, D72)。