Central clearing counterparties (CCPs) have a variety of economic rationales. The Great Recession of 2007–2009 led regulators to mandate CCPs for most interest-rate and credit derivatives, markets in which large amounts of risks are transferred across agents. This change led to a large increase in CCP studies, which along with classical studies are surveyed in this article. For example, multilateral netting, the insurance against counterparty risk, the effect of CCPs on asset prices and fire sales, margins setting, the default waterfall, and CCP governance are discussed here. We review both CCP theory and empirical work and conclude by discussing regulatory issues.

中文翻译：

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中央清算经济学

中央清算对手方 (CCP) 有多种经济原理。2007 年至 2009 年的大衰退导致监管机构对大多数利率和信用衍生品（其中大量风险跨代理转移的市场）强制要求中央对手方。这一变化导致 CCP 研究的大量增加，本文对这些研究和经典研究进行了调查。例如，多边净额结算、交易对手风险保险、CCP 对资产价格和抛售的影响、保证金设置、默认瀑布和 CCP 治理都在此处讨论。我们回顾了 CCP 理论和实证工作，并通过讨论监管问题得出结论。