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Agendas in legislative decision‐making
Theoretical Economics ( IF 1.671 ) Pub Date : 2021-01-01 , DOI: 10.3982/te2618
Sean Horan 1
Affiliation  

Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on two formats: the so‐called Euro–Latin and Anglo–American agendas. In the current paper, I introduce a broad class of agendas whose defining structural features—history‐independence and persistence—are common in legislative settings. I then characterize the social choice rules implemented by sophisticated voting on agendas with these two features. I also characterize the rules implemented by more specialized formats (called priority agendas and convex agendas) whose structure is closely related to the prevailing rules for order‐of‐voting used by legislatures. These results establish a clear connection between structure and outcomes for a wide range of legislative agendas.

中文翻译:

立法决策议程

尽管立法环境中使用了各种各样的议程,但有关复杂投票的文献集中在两种形式上:所谓的欧洲-拉丁美洲议程和英美议程。在本文中,我介绍了一大类议程,其定义结构特征——历史独立性和持久性——在立法环境中很常见。然后,我描述了通过对具有这两个特征的议程进行复杂投票所实施的社会选择规则。我还描述了由更专业的格式(称为优先议程和凸议程)实施的规则,其结构与立法机构使用的现行投票顺序规则密切相关。这些结果在广泛的立法议程的结构和结果之间建立了明确的联系。
更新日期:2021-01-01
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