The price mechanism is fundamental to economics but difficult to reconcile with incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We introduce a double clock auction for a homogeneous good market with multidimensional private information and multiunit traders that is deficit‐free, ex post individually rational, constrained efficient, and makes sincere bidding a dominant strategy equilibrium. Under a weak dependence and an identifiability condition, our double clock auction is also asymptotically efficient. Asymptotic efficiency is achieved by estimating demand and supply using information from the bids of traders that have dropped out and following a tâtonnement process that adjusts the clock prices based on the estimates.

中文翻译：

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一种基于估计的优势策略双时钟拍卖

价格机制是经济学的基础，但难以与激励相容性和个人理性相协调。我们为具有多维私人信息和多单位交易者的同质良好市场引入双时钟拍卖，该市场是无赤字、事后个体理性、约束有效并使真诚竞价成为优势策略均衡的。在弱依赖和可识别条件下，我们的双时钟拍卖也是渐近有效的。渐近效率是通过使用来自已退出交易者的投标的信息来估计需求和供应并遵循基于估计调整时钟价格的tâtonnement 过程来实现的。