A spotlight was directed by Laidler and Sandilands (2002) on the neglected 1932 Harvard memorandum (by Lauchlin Currie, Paul Theodore Ellsworth and Harry Dexter White). They interpret the memorandum as advocating fiscal inflationism as opposed to Keynesian fiscalism in tackling the Great Depression. While the former involves the creation of new money, the latter can operate independently of new money. This paper goes beyond this interpretation of the memorandum and argues the following: (i) the memorandum emphasises recovery in a manner which does not lose sight of secular growth; (ii) it does not take an isolationist position on the US depression but views it as a part of the broader international calamity; (iii) the memorandum appears at odds with the post-1936 notion of the liquidity trap and the consequent ineffectiveness of monetary policy and (iv) is aware of the various intricacies involved in expanding the money supply. In brief, the memorandum is an elegant piece of writing which displays a good understanding of the nuts and bolts of the money-supply process.

中文翻译：

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凯恩斯之前的货币凯恩斯主义？1932 年 1 月哈佛关于反抑郁政策的备忘录

莱德勒和桑迪兰兹 (Laidler and Sandilands)（2002 年）在被忽视的 1932 年哈佛备忘录（劳克林·柯里、保罗·西奥多·埃尔斯沃思和哈里·德克斯特·怀特）上引起了关注。他们将该备忘录解释为在应对大萧条时提倡财政通胀主义，而不是凯恩斯主义财政主义。前者涉及创造新货币，后者可以独立于新货币运作。本文超越了对备忘录的这种解释，并提出以下观点：(i) 备忘录强调复苏的方式不忽视长期增长；(ii) 它不对美国萧条采取孤立主义立场，而是将其视为更广泛的国际灾难的一部分；(iii) 该备忘录似乎与 1936 年后的流动性陷阱概念不一致，从而导致货币政策无效，并且 (iv) 意识到扩大货币供应所涉及的各种复杂性。简而言之，备忘录是一篇优雅的文章，显示了对货币供应过程的基本要素的良好理解。