Threats of violence, even when not actually carried out, can inflict real damage. As such, state and federal laws criminalize threats in a wide range of circumstances. But threats are also speech, and free speech is broadly protected by the First Amendment. The criminalization of threats is nonetheless possible because of Supreme Court precedents denying First Amendment protection to “true threats.” Yet a crucial question remains unanswered: What counts as a true threat?This Note examines courts’ attempts to answer this question and identifies the many ambiguities that have resulted from those attempts. In particular, this piece highlights three frontiers of judicial confusion that are likely to arise in a true threat case: (1) what type of intent the First Amendment requires, (2) the proper standard of review on appeals of true threat convictions, and (3) the contextual analyses in which courts engage to assess whether a threat is “true” (and, by extension, whether a threat conviction was constitutional). This third frontier is discussed most extensively, as it has the greatest impact on a case’s ultimate outcome. This Note also proposes a new framework for inquiries into the context of true threats, adapted from defamation law, in order to increase consistency and ensure adequate protection of speech rights within the chaotic true threat doctrine.

中文翻译：

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在第一修正案的真实威胁主义中寻找真理

暴力威胁，即使没有实际实施，也会造成真正的损害。因此，州和联邦法律将各种情况下的威胁定为刑事犯罪。但威胁也是言论，言论自由受到第一修正案的广泛保护。尽管如此，将威胁定为刑事犯罪是可能的，因为最高法院的先例否认第一修正案对“真正的威胁”的保护。然而，一个关键问题仍未得到解答：什么才是真正的威胁？本说明审查了法院试图回答这个问题的尝试，并指出了这些尝试导致的许多模棱两可的地方。特别是，这篇文章强调了在真实威胁案件中可能出现的三个司法混乱前沿：（1）第一修正案要求的意图类型，（2）对真实威胁定罪上诉的适当审查标准，(3) 法院参与评估威胁是否“真实”的背景分析（以及，延伸而言，威胁定罪是否符合宪法）。这第三个领域的讨论最为广泛，因为它对案件的最终结果影响最大。本说明还提出了一个新的框架，用于调查真实威胁的背景，改编自诽谤法，以增加一致性并确保在混乱的真实威胁理论中充分保护言论权利。