Using nationally representative survey data on 11,505 labor force participants, we examine the use and implementation of noncompete agreements and the employee outcomes associated with these provisions. Approximately 18 percent of labor force participants are bound by noncompetes, with 38 percent having agreed to at least one in the past. Noncompetes are more likely to be found in high-skill, high-paying jobs, but they are also common in low-skill, low-paying jobs and in states where noncompetes are unenforceable. Only 10 percent of employees negotiate over their noncompetes, and about one-third of employees are presented with noncompetes after having already accepted job offers. Early-notice noncompetes are associated with better employee outcomes, while employees who agree to late-notice noncompetes are comparatively worse off. Regardless of noncompete timing, however, wages are relatively lower where noncompetes are easier to enforce. We discuss these findings in light of competing theories of the economic value of noncompetes.

中文翻译：

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美国劳动力的竞业禁止协议

使用对 11,505 名劳动力参与者的全国代表性调查数据，我们检查了竞业禁止协议的使用和实施以及与这些条款相关的员工成果。大约 18% 的劳动力参与者受到竞业禁止的约束，其中 38% 的人在过去至少同意过一项。竞业禁止更可能出现在高技能、高薪的工作中，但它们在低技能、低薪的工作以及竞业禁止不可执行的州也很常见。只有 10% 的员工就他们的竞业禁止进行谈判，大约三分之一的员工在接受工作邀请后会收到竞业禁止。提前通知竞业禁止与更好的员工结果相关，而同意延迟通知竞业禁止的员工的情况相对较差。然而，无论竞业禁止时间如何，在竞业禁止更容易执行的地方，工资都相对较低。我们根据竞业禁止的经济价值的竞争理论来讨论这些发现。