A number of districts are moving toward a portfolio management model, in which central offices act as “portfolio managers” (PMs) that oversee—but may not actively manage—publicly funded schools. Using principal-agent theory, with its focus on goal alignment and the use of incentives, we explore how PMs operated in ways distinct from traditional district offices in Denver, New Orleans, and Los Angeles. We consider how PMs identify the goals of multiple principals, incentivize and monitor agents around principals’ goals, and select and develop agents who can meet principals’ goals. Drawing on 76 system-level interviews, we find that PMs in each city confronted similar tensions around PM responsibilities but addressed them differently. Specifically, we observed distinct PM approaches to managing competing goals of stakeholders in the context of school closure and to balancing school-based autonomy with more prescriptive measures for building school capacity and ensuring the equitable treatment of students.

中文翻译：

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从中央办公室到三个城市的投资组合经理：应对委托代理问题

许多学区正在转向投资组合管理模式，在这种模式中，中央办公室充当“投资组合经理”（PM），负责监督——但可能不会积极管理——公共资助的学校。我们使用委托代理理论，重点关注目标一致性和激励措施的使用，探讨 PM 如何以不同于丹佛、新奥尔良和洛杉矶的传统地区办事处的方式运作。我们考虑 PM 如何识别多个委托人的目标，围绕委托人的目标激励和监控代理人，以及选择和培养能够满足委托人目标的代理人。通过 76 次系统级访谈，我们发现每个城市的 PM 都面临着围绕 PM 职责的类似紧张局势，但处理方式不同。具体来说，