This paper investigates the influence of public risk mitigating activities on individuals' decisions to privately mitigate their disaster risks. We exploit heterogeneity in measures under the Community Rating System in the U.S. to empirically demonstrate that government investment in flood risk communication activities crowd-in private flood insurance demand while activities that lower the flood hazard residents face crowd-out private flood insurance demand. We also give evidence that flood insurance abides by the law of demand: as communities receive price discounts on their insurance policies, demand increases. Our results imply that governments can amplify the price effect by investing in additional risk communication activities, or dilute it by investing in hazard mitigation. This paper contributes to the discussion of the efficacy of disaster risk mitigation strategies and who ultimately bears the costs of natural disasters.

中文翻译：

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公共洪水风险缓解和房主保险需求响应

本文调查了公共风险减轻活动对个人私下减轻灾害风险决策的影响。我们利用美国社区评级系统下措施的异质性，实证证明政府对洪水风险交流活动的投资挤入了私人洪水保险需求，而降低洪水灾害居民的活动则挤掉了私人洪水保险需求。我们还提供证据表明洪水保险遵守需求定律：随着社区在其保险单上获得价格折扣，需求增加。我们的研究结果表明，政府可以通过投资额外的风险沟通活动来放大价格效应，或者通过投资减灾来稀释价格效应。