We study how policy uncertainty influences textual disclosure in the U.S. from 1996 to 2015. Consistent with incentives for voluntary disclosure, we find that policy uncertainty increases textual disclosure quantity, as evident in disclosure length, but lowers textual readability and increases the tone of uncertainty and negativity. We also document that the negative impact on readability subsides when firms are subject to tough external monitoring. Finally, we provide evidence implying that investors perceive such disclosure to be valuable, as evident in cheaper equity financing costs under economic policy uncertainty.

中文翻译：

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政策不确定性和文本披露

我们研究了 1996 年至 2015 年美国的政策不确定性如何影响文本披露。与自愿披露的激励措施一致，我们发现政策不确定性增加了文本披露的数量，这在披露长度上很明显，但降低了文本的可读性并增加了不确定性和消极性。我们还记录了当公司受到严格的外部监控时，对可读性的负面影响会减弱。最后，我们提供的证据表明投资者认为这种披露是有价值的，这在经济政策不确定性下更便宜的股权融资成本中显而易见。