Using a sample of cross-listed firms from 51 countries and a difference-in-differences approach that exploits corporate governance shocks induced by cross-listing in the U.S., we find that firms tend to engage in less tax avoidance after cross-listing. This effect is more pronounced for firms that experience significant improvements in corporate governance, and for firms from countries with weaker shareholder protection and disclosure requirements. Taken together, the results indicate that cross-listing in the U.S. helps align the interests of managers and shareholders and reduces managerial diversion.

中文翻译：

---

公司治理与避税：来自美国交叉上市的证据

使用来自 51 个国家的交叉上市公司样本和利用美国交叉上市引起的公司治理冲击的差异差异方法，我们发现公司在交叉上市后倾向于较少避税。对于公司治理显着改善的公司，以及来自股东保护和披露要求较弱的国家的公司，这种影响更为明显。综上所述，结果表明，在美国交叉上市有助于协调管理者和股东的利益，并减少管理层的分流。