Regulation is often proposed, developed, and finalized over a lengthy rule-making period prior to its adoption. We examine the period over which banking authorities discussed, adopted, and implemented Basel III to understand how firms respond to proposed regulation. We find evidence to suggest that affected banks not only lobbied rule makers against it, but that they also made strategic financial reporting changes and altered their business models in ways that reduced their exposure to the proposed rule prior to rule makers finalizing the regulation. Further, our results indicate a sequential response, with banks responding through lobbying and strategic financial reporting prior to making business model changes. These findings highlight the interplay among firms’ financial reporting, business model, and political choices in response to proposed regulation, and indicate that the appropriate date for an event study may be the regulation’s announcement date rather than its adoption or implementation dates.

中文翻译：

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拟议法规的预期效果：来自巴塞尔协议 III 的证据

法规通常是在通过之前的漫长的规则制定期间提出、制定和最终确定的。我们研究了银行当局讨论、采用和实施巴塞尔协议 III 的时期，以了解企业如何应对拟议的监管。我们发现有证据表明，受影响的银行不仅游说规则制定者反对它，而且他们还进行了战略性财务报告更改并改变了他们的商业模式，以减少他们在规则制定者最终确定监管之前对拟议规则的风险。此外，我们的结果表明，银行在进行商业模式改变之前会通过游说和战略财务报告做出回应。这些发现突出了公司财务报告、商业模式、