We show that a mid-2000s increase in extraterritorial enforcement of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), characterized by greater international regulatory cooperation and more frequent use of the FCPA’s accounting provisions, has a significant deterrent effect on foreign direct investment in high-corruption-risk countries. The decrease in investment is at least as large for non-US as for US firms, suggesting that widespread extraterritorial enforcement helps to create a level foreign-investment playing field. Firms under US jurisdiction with fundamental characteristics that make it more difficult to maintain effective internal controls invest less in high-corruption-risk countries after the FCPA enforcement increase, suggesting regulatory compliance costs play a role in deterring investment. Consistent with investments in accounting systems being one way firms limit enforcement risk when investing in high-corruption-risk countries, firms pursuing new investments spend more time evaluating potential targets and firms with existing investments report fewer restatements related to unintentional errors.

中文翻译：

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世界警察：域外 FCPA 执法对外国投资和内部控制的影响

我们表明，2000 年代中期美国反海外腐败法 (FCPA) 域外执法的增加，其特点是加强国际监管合作和更频繁地使用 FCPA 的会计条款，对外国直接投资具有显着的威慑作用。腐败风险国家。非美国公司的投资减少至少与美国公司一样大，这表明广泛的域外执法有助于创造一个公平的外国投资竞争环境。在 FCPA 执法增加后，美国管辖范围内的公司具有使维持有效内部控制变得更加困难的基本特征，在高腐败风险国家的投资减少，这表明监管合规成本在阻止投资方面发挥了作用。