Abstract Why does fighting recur after some civil conflicts, whereas peace consolidates following others? The untested conventional wisdom is that—absent safeguards—postwar elections are dangerous for peace because electoral losers will reject the election results and remilitarize. New cross-national data on postwar election results and belligerent-level data on remilitarization contest this view. Citizens tend to elect peace because they engage in “security voting”; they elect the party that they deem best able to secure the state, using the war outcome as the heuristic that guides their security vote. Findings indicate that the chance of renewed war increases if there is an inversion in the military balance of power after war, and the war-loser performs poorly in the elections. If, instead, relative military power remains stable, or citizens accurately update their understandings of the postwar power balance, a civil war actor is unlikely to remilitarize if it loses the election. Knowing when and how these belligerent electoral actors choose to either sustain or break the peace informs important theoretical and policy debates on how to harness democracy's benefits while mitigating its risks.

中文翻译：

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告别武器？内战后的选举结果与持久和平

摘要 为什么在一些国内冲突之后会发生战斗，而在其他冲突之后会出现和平？未经检验的传统智慧是——缺乏保障——战后选举对和平是危险的，因为选举失败者将拒绝选举结果并重新军事化。关于战后选举结果的新的跨国数据和关于重新军事化的交战方数据与这一观点不符。公民倾向于选择和平，因为他们参与“安全投票”；他们选择他们认为最有能力保护国家安全的政党，使用战争结果作为指导他们的安全投票的启发式。研究结果表明，如果战后军事力量平衡发生倒置，并且战争失败者在选举中表现不佳，重新爆发战争的可能性就会增加。相反，如果相对军事力量保持稳定，或者公民准确地更新他们对战后权力平衡的理解，内战参与者如果输掉选举不太可能重新军事化。了解这些好战的选举行为者何时以及如何选择维持和平或破坏和平，将为有关如何利用民主的好处同时减轻其风险的重要理论和政策辩论提供信息。