Abstract Does nuclear superiority offer states political or military benefits? And do those benefits accrue beyond acquiring a secure second-strike capability? International relations theory has long held that nuclear superiority does not confer significant advantages, a conclusion supported by much of the qualitative literature on bargaining and crisis interactions between nuclear-armed states. New work by scholars using statistical methods to analyze data on nuclear crises, interstate disputes, and compellent threats has sought to answer these questions, producing conflicting results. Despite the contributions of these recent works, this line of research has assumed that warhead counts are an appropriate measure of nuclear capabilities and that states possess accurate information about the material balance. Instead, states use multiple quantitative and qualitative characteristics to evaluate the nuclear balance, and they often have inaccurate or incomplete information about the size, composition, and configuration of other states' nuclear forces. Using new data, replications of two prominent recent works show that results are sensitive to how the nuclear balance is operationalized. Drawing on archival and interview data from the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, findings show how states and leaders often understand and respond to the nuclear balance in inconsistent, asymmetric, and subjective ways.

中文翻译：

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核平衡是国家做出来的

摘要 核优势会给国家带来政治或军事利益吗？除了获得安全的二次打击能力之外，这些好处还会累积吗？国际关系理论长期以来一直认为，核优势不会带来显着优势，这一结论得到了许多关于核武器国家之间讨价还价和危机互动的定性文献的支持。学者们使用统计方法分析有关核危机、国家间争端和强制性威胁的数据的新工作试图回答这些问题，产生了相互矛盾的结果。尽管这些最近的工作做出了贡献，但这一研究方向假设弹头数量是衡量核能力的适当衡量标准，并且各国拥有有关物质平衡的准确信息。反而，各国使用多种定量和定性特征来评估核平衡，而且它们对其他国家核力量的规模、组成和配置的信息往往不准确或不完整。使用新数据，最近两项著名作品的复制表明，结果对核平衡的运作方式很敏感。利用冷战期间美国和苏联的档案和采访数据，调查结果显示了国家和领导人通常如何以不一致、不对称和主观的方式理解和应对核平衡。对最近两部著名作品的复制表明，结果对核平衡的运作方式很敏感。利用冷战期间美国和苏联的档案和采访数据，调查结果显示了国家和领导人通常如何以不一致、不对称和主观的方式理解和应对核平衡。对最近两部著名作品的复制表明，结果对核平衡的运作方式很敏感。利用冷战期间美国和苏联的档案和采访数据，调查结果显示了国家和领导人通常如何以不一致、不对称和主观的方式理解和应对核平衡。