Warren Montag’s review generously offers alternative paths for examining some of the theses advanced in Epistemontology, while inviting me to elaborate on the precise sense of a key epistemontological term, “homology,” and to set epistemontology once again in dialogue with Althusser and Macherey, including regarding the concepts of monism and structure.1 Montag’s review centers around what he considers to constitute “the heart of Kordela’s initiative,” namely Spinoza’s proposition that “the order and connections of ideas is the same as the order and connections of things” (Ethics II, P7). This proposition follows from the fact that, “according to Spinoza’s monistic principle, thought (mind) and things (bodies or extension) are manifestations of one and the same being or substance” (E, 1; cited by Montag). However, this does not mean that thought and things are the same, since it is “in spite of the incommensurable difference between ideas and things, [that] their relations share the same structures, and both, ideas and things, express the same substance or being” (E, 1; cited by Montag). Epistemontology refers to this relation between thought or ideas and extension or things (bodies) by using the term “homology,” whose exact meaning becomes a question for both Montag and Clemens and Hughes, with homology in the biological sense, analogy, isomorphism, and parallelism (a term that I also use) being considered by the reviewers as possible candidates. Before proceeding to address this point, it will be useful to summarize the main thesis of epistemontology, according to which substance or Being is the unvarying power of actualizing itself in beings that are conceived as either structures or as what exceeds them. To quote from

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对沃伦·蒙塔格对认识论的评论的回应

沃伦·蒙塔格的评论慷慨地为检验认识论中的一些先进论文提供了替代途径，同时邀请我详细阐述一个关键认识论术语“同源性”的确切含义，并在与阿尔都塞和马舍雷的对话中再次设定认识论，包括1 蒙塔格的评论围绕着他认为构成“科尔德拉倡议的核心”的东西，即斯宾诺莎的主张，即“思想的秩序和联系与事物的秩序和联系相同”（伦理学二，P7）。这个命题源于这样一个事实：“根据斯宾诺莎的一元论原则，思想（心灵）和事物（身体或外延）是同一个存在或实体的表现”（E，1；蒙塔格引用）。然而，这并不意味着思想和事物是相同的，因为“尽管思想和事物之间存在不可通约的差异，但它们的关系具有相同的结构，并且思想和事物都表达相同的实体或存在”（E，1；Montag 引用）。认识论通过使用术语“同源性”来指代思想或观念与外延或事物（身体）之间的这种关系，其确切含义成为蒙塔格、克莱门斯和休斯的一个问题，具有生物学意义上的同源性、类比、同构和并行性（我也使用的一个术语）被审稿人视为可能的候选者。在继续讨论这一点之前，总结一下认识论的主要论点是有用的，根据哪个实体或存在是在被设想为结构或超越它们的存在者中实现自身的不变力量。引用自