If someone disagrees with my moral views, or more generally if I’m in a group of n people who all disagree with each other, but I don’t have any special evidence or basis for my epistemic superiority, then it’s at best a 1-in-n chance that my views are correct. The skeptical threat from disagreement is thus a kind of moral lottery, to adapt a similar metaphor from Sharon Street. Her own genealogical debunking argument, as I discuss, relies on a premise of such disagreement among evolutionary counterparts.In this paper, I resist the threat from disagreement by showing that, on some of the most influential and most attractive theories of content determination, the premise of moral disagreement cannot serve any skeptical or revisionary purposes. I examine and criticize attempts, made by Gilbert Harman and Sharon Street, to argue from disagreement to relativism by relying on a theory of content determination that involves a principle that, within certain constraints, maximizes the attribution to us of true beliefs. And I examine and criticize Robert Williams’s attempt to show there is moral disagreement by relying on a theory of content determination that involves a principle that instead maximizes the attribution to us of rationality. My overall aim is to defend commonsense moral realism via a careful look at the theory of content and concepts.

中文翻译：

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我们在玩道德彩票吗？从元语义的角度来看道德分歧

如果有人不同意我的道德观点，或者更一般地说，如果我在一群彼此不同意的人中，但我没有任何特殊证据或基础证明我的认知优势，那么充其量是 1 -in-n 机会我的观点是正确的。因此，来自分歧的怀疑威胁是一种道德彩票，以适应莎朗街的类似比喻。正如我所讨论的，她自己的系谱揭穿论点依赖于进化对应物之间存在这种分歧的前提。在这篇论文中，我通过证明，在一些最具影响力和最有吸引力的内容决定理论中，我抵制了来自分歧的威胁。道德分歧的前提不能用于任何怀疑或修正的目的。我审查并批评吉尔伯特哈曼和莎朗街的尝试，通过依赖内容决定理论，从分歧到相对主义进行辩论，该理论涉及一个原则，该原则在某些限制下，最大限度地归因于我们的真实信念。我检查并批评罗伯特·威廉姆斯试图通过依赖内容决定理论来表明存在道德分歧，该理论涉及一个原则，相反最大化我们的理性归因。我的总体目标是通过仔细研究内容和概念的理论来捍卫常识性的道德现实主义。我检查并批评罗伯特·威廉姆斯试图通过依赖内容决定理论来表明存在道德分歧，该理论涉及一个原则，相反最大化我们的理性归因。我的总体目标是通过仔细研究内容和概念的理论来捍卫常识性的道德现实主义。我检查并批评罗伯特·威廉姆斯试图通过依赖内容决定理论来表明存在道德分歧，该理论涉及一个原则，相反最大化我们的理性归因。我的总体目标是通过仔细研究内容和概念的理论来捍卫常识性的道德现实主义。