This paper examines the degree of permissible interference with a judge’s freedom of expressing his/her own opinion and convictions. A question is raised about the limits of a judge’s freedom of expression and discretion of the state in establishing his/her communicative behaviour, taking into account the established practice of theEuropean Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR, the Court). Understanding these limits is important not only for individual judges but also for society as a whole, as restrictions on freedom of expression may affect the state’s perception of the rule of law.Systematic analysis of the key documents that regulate the issue of freedom of expression of a judge in Ukraine allows us to identify several spheres of imperative regulation of a judge’s behaviour in the context of communicative activity: during the administration of justice (in court procedure); in public speeches, particularly in the media; during the implementation of other activities not prohibited for the judge – literary, scientific, educational; during Internet communication; in everyday life.ECtHR case-law in the context of assessing the limits of a judge’s freedom of expressing one’s opinion develops in two directions. In the first, the judge’s freedom is considered in the context of Art. 10 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly and association) of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR, the Convention). In the second, the right to freedom of expression is limited to the right to a fair trial of others (in the context of impartiality and independence of a court within the meaning of Art. 6 of the ECHR). In general, the matter of judicial evaluation was the statements of judges concerning cases that were in their proceedings; those criticising judicial reform measures and other administrative actions; those which criticised their colleagues.The results of the analysis allow us to conclude that, despite the different preconditions, different circumstances, and varying implementation reflections, the freedom of a judge to express his/ her opinion is limited by his/her special status as a state servant (in a broad sense). Where the boundary is in a particular case should be determined by considering the specific circumstances. However, national law enforcement authorities must develop their own criteria for assessing the balance of public and private interests in a judge’s communicative behaviour

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法官表达自己意见自由的限制：乌克兰语境和欧洲人权法院实践

本文研究了对法官表达自己意见和信念的自由的允许干预程度。考虑到欧洲人权法院（以下简称 ECtHR，法院）的既定做法，提出了一个关于法官言论自由和国家在确定其交流行为方面的自由裁量权的限制的问题。了解这些限制不仅对法官个人而且对整个社会都很重要，因为对言论自由的限制可能会影响国家对法治的看法。对规范言论自由问题的关键文件的系统分析乌克兰的一名法官使我们能够确定在交流活动的背景下对法官行为的强制性监管的几个领域：在司法行政期间（在法庭程序中）；在公开演讲中，特别是在媒体上；在执行法官不禁止的其他活动期间——文学、科学、教育；在互联网通信期间；在日常生活中。欧洲人权法院判例法在评估法官表达意见自由的限度时有两个方向发展。首先，法官的自由是在艺术的背景下考虑的。欧洲人权公约（以下简称 ECHR，公约）第 10 条（思想、良心和宗教自由、言论自由以及集会和结社自由）。其次，言论自由权仅限于对他人进行公平审判的权利（在第 3 条意义上的法院公正和独立的背景下）《欧洲人权公约》第 6 条）。一般来说，司法评估的问题是法官对正在审理的案件的陈述；批评司法改革措施和其他行政行为的；分析结果使我们得出结论，尽管前提条件不同，情况不同，实施反思不同，但法官发表意见的自由受到其特殊身份的限制。国家公务员（广义上）。具体在哪里，应结合具体情况确定。但是，国家执法机关必须制定自己的标准，以评估法官交流行为中公共利益和私人利益的平衡。司法评估事项是法官对正在审理的案件的陈述；批评司法改革措施和其他行政行为的；分析结果使我们得出结论，尽管前提条件不同，情况不同，实施反思不同，但法官发表意见的自由受到其特殊身份的限制。国家公务员（广义上）。具体在哪里，应结合具体情况确定。但是，国家执法机关必须制定自己的标准，以评估法官交流行为中公共利益和私人利益的平衡。司法评估事项是法官对正在审理的案件的陈述；批评司法改革措施和其他行政行为的；分析结果使我们得出结论，尽管前提条件不同，情况不同，实施反思不同，但法官发表意见的自由受到其特殊身份的限制。国家公务员（广义上）。具体在哪里，应结合具体情况确定。但是，国家执法机关必须制定自己的标准，以评估法官交流行为中公共利益和私人利益的平衡。