assassination attempt or even a coup. However, all too soon it became clear that the triumph was to be thrown away. No more than he could with any other partner – the prime example is Alexander I of Russia in the period 1807–1810 – the French ruler could not bring himself to treat the pope as an equal, and that despite the fact that Pius VII for the most part showed himself to be more than willing to work with Napoleon on such matters as his coronation. A particular stumbling block was the fact that the supreme pontiff was as much a secular ruler as he was a spiritual one, the so-called Papal States having afforded him and his predecessors a secure base that in theory guaranteed their complete independence. To Napoleon, however, borders were as nothing, and the period from 1803 to 1808 saw a series of encroachments on Pius’ territories that eventually resulted in their complete occupation, other issues that caused problems being the insistence, first, that the Papal States should become a part of the Continental Blockade and thereby a de facto French ally, and, second, that the Concordat should be extended willy-nilly to Italy and Germany. Gentle a figure though Pius might have appeared to be, he was possessed by a steely determination to defend the interests of the Church and he therefore instituted a series of counter-measures which soon had Napoleon seething with anger. Eventually losing his temper altogether, in 1809 the emperor resorted to force and seized the person of the pope, the latter eventually being installed in a more-or-less decorous exile in Savona. The result was disaster: by refusing to budge an inch, Pius made a mockery of the emperor, across the empire; loyal Catholics turned their back upon the regime; and power after power was confirmed in the view that Napoleon was simply not someone with whom it was possible to do business. As was so often the case, then, the French ruler was his own worst enemy. Fascinating story though all this makes, it is not one that has received much attention in the English-language historiography, the only previous monograph on the subject having appeared as long ago as 1962. To Kidnap a Pope, however, more than makes up for the want. Brilliantly written, based on meticulous research in the archives and beautifully produced, it is a book that should be on the shelves of any serious Napoleonist as well as one that ought to be read with particular attention by those who continue to be mesmerized by visions of ‘Napoleon the Great’: if the French ruler earned any epithet from his persistent bullying of an elderly and infirm man, it was surely rather that of ‘Napoleon the Little’.

中文翻译：

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书评：1914 年萨拉热窝：引发第一次世界大战马克·康沃尔

暗杀企图甚至政变。然而，很快就清楚胜利将被抛弃。就像他与任何其他伙伴一样——最好的例子是 1807 年至 1810 年期间的俄罗斯亚历山大一世——法国统治者不能让自己平等地对待教皇，尽管事实上庇护七世为大多数人表明自己非常愿意在拿破仑的加冕等问题上与他合作。一个特别的绊脚石是最高教皇既是世俗统治者又是精神统治者，所谓的教皇国为他和他的前任提供了一个安全的基础，理论上保证了他们的完全独立。然而，对于拿破仑来说，边界无足轻重，从 1803 年到 1808 年期间，皮乌斯的领土发生了一系列侵占，最终导致他们完全占领，其他引起问题的问题是坚持认为，首先，教皇国应该成为大陆封锁的一部分，从而事实上，法国的盟友，其次，协约应该不顾一切地扩展到意大利和德国。皮乌斯看似温文尔雅，但他执着于捍卫教会利益的坚定决心，因此他制定了一系列反制措施，很快让拿破仑怒火中烧。最终完全发脾气，1809年皇帝诉诸武力并抓住了教皇的人，后者最终被安置在萨沃纳的或多或少的流放地中。结果是灾难：皮乌斯一寸不动，在整个帝国都嘲弄了皇帝。忠诚的天主教徒背弃了政权；一个又一个的权力得到了证实，认为拿破仑根本不是可以与之做生意的人。就像经常发生的那样，法国统治者是他自己最大的敌人。尽管这一切令人着迷，但它在英语史学中并没有受到太多关注，这是唯一一部早在 1962 年就已出版的关于该主题的专着。然而，绑架教皇却远远弥补了这一不足。想要的。写得精彩，基于对档案的细致研究和精美的制作，