Contemporary philosophers interested in Fichte have more reason to rejoice.1 In the last few years, a number of significant publications have appeared on J. G. Fichte, concerned primarily with his moral philosophy. Owen Ware’s new book Fichte’s Moral Philosophy is one of these. In this review, I shall say a few remarks about how Ware’s book fits into the territory being mapped by Fichte scholars, and then ask some questions of the content of the book itself. The overriding theme of Ware’s book is a welcome account of Fichte, presenting him as concerned with wholeness or unity. Humankind is originally one, but rational reflection makes us estranged from ourselves. Fichte, on Ware’s account, laments this condition, and articulates a moral philosophy, derived from the foundational principles of philosophical science (Wissenschaftslehre) which incorporates this insight into the human condition and shows us how to make sense of it. As Ware puts it, Fichte’s notion of an individual agent’s ethical vocation is spelled out in terms of ‘reuniting with our nature, which he views as a state of undivided wholeness’ (p. 12). Naturally, Ware does not mean that Fichte should be read as arguing for a return to a romantic golden age, but rather as thinking that our drives, or dispositions, to self-love and morality can be rendered harmonious through life-long moral effort. In setting out Fichte’s vision, Ware traces Fichte’s thoughts from the origins, in the discovery that Kant showed the way forward – exposing Fichte’s early dilemma, a mindless heart or heartless mind, as a false one (p. 6). He then guides the reader through a second chapter, a historically informed discussion on the nature of the free will, a third chapter on the nature and source of moral authority, a fourth on the theory of the drives, a fifth regarding the nature of conscience, especially paying attention to Fichte’s strong claim that conscience never errs, a sixth chapter on Fichte’s account of how evil is possible, a seventh focusing on the role of community in moral theory, and an eighth on perfection and the

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Owen Ware 的《费希特的道德哲学》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，2020 年）

对费希特感兴趣的当代哲学家更有理由欢欣鼓舞。1 在过去的几年里，JG Fichte 出现了许多重要的出版物，主要关注他的道德哲学。欧文·韦尔的新书《费希特的道德哲学》就是其中之一。在这篇评论中，我将对 Ware 的书如何融入费希特学者所描绘的领域进行一些评论，然后就本书本身的内容提出一些问题。Ware 书中最重要的主题是对 Fichte 的欢迎描述，表明他关注整体或统一。人类本来就是一体的，但理性的反思却让我们疏远了自己。根据韦尔的说法，费希特对这种情况感到悲哀，并阐明了一种道德哲学，源自哲学科学的基本原理 (Wissenschaftslehre)，它将这种洞察力融入到人类状况中，并向我们展示了如何理解它。正如 Ware 所说，费希特关于个体代理人的道德使命的概念被阐明为“与我们的本性重新结合，他认为这是一种不可分割的整体状态”（第 12 页）。当然，韦尔并不意味着费希特应该被解读为主张回归浪漫的黄金时代，而是认为我们的自爱和道德的驱动力或性情可以通过终生的道德努力变得和谐。在阐述费希特的愿景时，韦尔从源头追溯费希特的思想，发现康德指明了前进的方向——将费希特早期的两难困境——一颗无心之心或无心之心暴露为虚假的（第 6 页）。