There have recently been many calls to explore corporate governance in emerging economies, as these countries have distinctive characteristics such as a weaker institutional environment and the dominating influence of controlling shareholders. The literature has revealed that, in such institutional settings, there is the risk that powerful insiders maximize their own benefits at the expense of minorities and firm performance. This study advances our knowledge of corporate governance in emerging economies by exploring the moderating impact of quad-qualified directors – i.e., directors with independence, expertise, bandwidth, and motivation – on the relationship between dominant-owner CEOs and firm performance. We tested our hypotheses on a large cross-sectional sample of Indian listed firms. Our results show that dominant-owner CEOs undermine company performance, but quad-qualified directors may improve board monitoring and consequently attenuate their negative influence. Our findings support the soundness of the quad-qualified model for boards of directors, and contribute to the growing literature investigating which directors’ attributes may have a significant impact on board monitoring and firm performance.

由于新兴经济体具有制度环境薄弱、控股股东主导影响等显着特点，近来很多人呼吁探索新兴经济体的公司治理。文献表明，在这样的制度环境中，强大的内部人士可能会以牺牲少数群体和公司业绩为代价来最大化自己的利益。本研究通过探索具有四重资质的董事（即具有独立性、专业知识、带宽和积极性的董事）对占主导地位的 CEO 与公司绩效之间的关系的调节作用，提高了我们对新兴经济体公司治理的认识。我们在印度上市公司的大型横截面样本上检验了我们的假设。我们的研究结果表明，占主导地位的 CEO 会削弱公司绩效，但具备四重资格的董事可能会改善董事会监督，从而削弱他们的负面影响。我们的研究结果支持董事会四重资格模型的合理性，并有助于越来越多的文献调查哪些董事的属性可能对董事会监督和公司绩效产生重大影响。