An important question for the major central banks of the industrialized world is how to design desirable strategies to exit quantitative easing (QE). At the exit, if a central bank needs to reduce rapidly the liquidity created by its balance sheet expansion, issuing new interest-bearing liabilities would be preferable to rapidly shrinking the balance sheet by selling existing assets, both for the stability of those assets' markets and to be able to keep capital losses from being reflected in the balance sheet under amortized-cost accounting. Given that existing assets accumulated during the quantitative easing period have low interest returns, and new liabilities to be issued in the quantitative tightening period would have high interest payouts, the central bank may run a loss that may threaten its solvency, which may force the bank to expand the monetary base above the level that is consistent with the central bank's ideal price stability path. This study considers a central bank that exits QE by issuing liabilities and examines an optimal exit strategy while maintaining the solvency by constructing a simple dynamic optimization model. The model is then applied to the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve to examine their possible exits.

工业化世界主要央行面临的一个重要问题是如何设计退出量化宽松 (QE) 的理想策略。在退出时，如果中央银行需要迅速减少其资产负债表扩张所产生的流动性，发行新的有息负债比通过出售现有资产迅速收缩资产负债表更可取，这既是为了这些资产市场的稳定并且能够防止资本损失在摊销成本会计下反映在资产负债表中。鉴于量化宽松期间积累的存量资产利息回报率低，量化紧缩期间新发行负债的利息支出较高，央行可能出现亏损，威胁偿债能力，这可能会迫使银行将货币基础扩大到与央行理想的价格稳定路径相一致的水平之上。本研究考虑了一家通过发行负债退出量化宽松政策的央行，并通过构建一个简单的动态优化模型来检验最优退出策略，同时保持偿付能力。然后将该模型应用于日本银行和美联储，以检查它们可能的退出。