Abstract

For fashion products that have rather uncertain consumer demands, retailers can use the demand-chasing tactic to mitigate the uncertainty. Specifically, the demand-chasing retailer can place small, initial orders to identify which products are popular and then press suppliers to deliver expedited reorders. Moreover, the retailer can reduce the required lead time, and the supplier can either ramp up capacity levels to fulfill the reorders in a timely manner or face hefty penalties. However, the supplier prefers receiving firm order commitments as far in advance as possible for better capacity planning. This conflict of interest regarding capacity levels creates tension, especially if the supplier and retailer have unequal channel powers. The goal of this research is to provide a better understanding of the required lead time and how it affects capacity decisions in a decentralized supply chain. We use game-theoretic models to show the implications of required lead time and channel power on capacity decisions. In addition, we propose contract mechanisms that can coordinate the supply chain and optimize capacity levels.

摘要

对于消费者需求相当不确定的时尚产品，零售商可以使用需求追逐策略来缓解不确定性。具体来说，追逐需求的零售商可以下少量的初始订单以确定哪些产品受欢迎，然后敦促供应商加快再订购。此外，零售商可以缩短所需的交货时间，而供应商要么提高产能水平以及时完成再订货，要么面临巨额罚款。然而，供应商更愿意尽可能提前收到确定的订单承诺，以便更好地规划产能。这种关于产能水平的利益冲突会造成紧张，尤其是当供应商和零售商拥有不平等的渠道权力时。这项研究的目的是更好地了解所需的交货时间以及它如何影响分散供应链中的产能决策。我们使用博弈论模型来显示所需的提前期和渠道能力对容量决策的影响。此外，我们提出了可以协调供应链和优化产能水平的合同机制。