We consider a market economy where two rational agents are able to learn the distribution of future events. In this context, we study whether moving away from the standard Bayesian belief updating, in the sense of under-reaction to some degree to new information, may be strategically convenient for traders. We show that, in equilibrium, strong under-reaction occurs, thus rational agents may strategically want to bias their learning process. Our analysis points out that the underlying mechanism driving ex-ante strategical decisions is diversity seeking. Finally, we show that, even if robust with respect to strategy selection, strong under-reaction can generate low realized welfare levels because of a long transient phase in which the agent makes poor predictions.

我们考虑一个市场经济，其中两个理性代理能够了解未来事件的分布。在这种情况下，我们研究了从标准的贝叶斯信念更新（在某种程度上对新信息反应不足的意义上）是否对交易者具有战略上的便利。我们表明，在平衡状态下，会发生强烈的反应不足，因此理性的代理人可能会战略性地希望对他们的学习过程产生偏见。我们的分析指出，推动事前战略决策的潜在机制是寻求多样性。最后，我们表明，即使在策略选择方面很稳健，强烈的反应不足也会产生低的实际福利水平，因为代理做出糟糕的预测的过渡阶段很长。