The Verifiability Approach is a lie detection method based on the insight that truth-tellers provide precise details whereas liars sometimes remain vague to avoid being exposed. We provide a game-theoretic foundation for the strategic effect that underlies this approach. We consider a speaker who wants to be acquitted and an investigator who prefers to find out the truth. The investigator can verify the speaker’s statement at some cost; verification gets more reliable the more details are provided. If, after a falsified statement, the investigator convicts, an additional penalty is imposed. Constructing precise but false statements is assumed to be cognitively costly. We derive all equilibria and thereby the conditions under which the investigator can infer valuable information from the speaker’s statement at face value. If cognitive costs are not prohibitively high, these require that liars are deterred from making false precise statements if always verified. Strategic information revelation by the speaker and verification by the investigator then necessarily work in tandem in a partially pooling equilibrium. Improvements in reliability result in more valuable information via the statements per se, whereas larger lying costs or a harsher penalty do not once the deterrence condition for the existence of this equilibrium is met.

中文翻译：

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测谎：可验证性方法的战略分析

可验证性方法是一种谎言检测方法，它基于这样一种洞察力：说真话的人提供精确的细节，而说谎者有时会保持模糊以避免被曝光。我们为这种方法背后的战略效果提供了博弈论基础。我们考虑一个想要被无罪释放的演讲者和一个喜欢找出真相的调查员。调查员可以支付一定的费用来验证说话者的陈述；提供的详细信息越多，验证就越可靠。如果在虚假陈述后，调查员有罪，则处以额外的处罚。假设构建精确但错误的陈述在认知上代价高昂。我们推导出所有的平衡，从而推导出调查人员可以从说话者的表面价值的陈述中推断出有价值的信息的条件。如果认知成本不是高得令人望而却步，那么就需要阻止说谎者在总是得到验证的情况下做出虚假的精确陈述。演讲者的战略信息启示和调查者的验证必然会在部分汇集平衡中协同工作。可靠性的提高会通过陈述本身产生更有价值的信息，而一旦满足这种均衡存在的威慑条件，更大的撒谎成本或更严厉的惩罚就不会。