Abstract

Securitization to attain bankruptcy remoteness separates the risks of the originator bank from the income-producing asset by structuring the asset sale between the Special Purpose Vehicle and the transferor as a “true sale” as opposed to that of financing an asset transfer. Should the transferor subsequently file for bankruptcy, the transferred assets will be exempted from the transferor’s bankruptcy estate, and the investors’ secured assets in the SPV are not at risk of loss. Once commercial banks no longer bear the risk of these bankruptcy-remote securitized loans, creeping deterioration in bank lending standards occurred/are occurring via weaker screening, lower denial rates, and misreporting of credit quality. When this type of structured finance became institutionally pervasive, what may have reduced risk at the micro-level quietly engenders non-linear systemic risk. In remedy to this, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform is at best an incomplete international vision. Regulators must make-up for its inadequacies by increasing capital adequacy requirements which ensure banks operate in a prudential manner. Profit-maximization (shareholders) and capital adequacy (Society) must err on the side of capital adequacy given the public-private hybrid nature of money that is backstopped by the private-public Federal Reserve.

摘要

实现破产隔离的证券化通过将特殊目的载体与转让方之间的资产销售结构化为“真正的销售”，而不是为资产转让融资，从而将发起银行的风险与创收资产分开。如果转让方随后申请破产，所转让的资产将免于转让方的破产财产，投资者在 SPV 中的担保资产不存在损失风险。一旦商业银行不再承担这些远离破产的证券化贷款的风险，银行贷款标准就会出现/正在通过更弱的筛选、更低的拒绝率和误报信用质量而发生/正在发生。当这种类型的结构性融资在制度上变得普遍时，可能在微观层面降低风险的东西悄悄地产生了非线性的系统性风险。为了弥补这一点，多德-弗兰克华尔街改革充其量只是一个不完整的国际视野。监管机构必须通过提高资本充足率要求来弥补其不足，以确保银行以审慎的方式运营。鉴于由公私联储支持的货币的公私混合性质，利润最大化（股东）和资本充足率（社会）必须在资本充足率方面犯错。