In this paper, I will make the case that an associative account of predication in Hume seems to allow for impossible predicative conceptions—that is, the conceiving of impossible states of affairs involving subjects instantiating properties or qualities—which violate his Conceivability Principle. The natural response is to argue that such conceptions are not clear and distinct, but substantive worries are raised about a number of attempted solutions along these lines. This poses a predicament for Hume scholars: either we must modify or abandon the Conceivability Principle, or reject an associative account of predication, or concede that Hume faces a difficulty he cannot solve.

中文翻译：

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预测和休谟的可想性原则

在本文中，我将证明休谟对谓词的关联说明似乎允许不可能的谓词概念——即设想涉及主体实例化属性或品质的不可能事态——这违反了他的可想象性原则。自然的反应是争辩说这样的概念不清晰和不同，但对沿着这些思路尝试的许多解决方案提出了实质性的担忧。这给休谟学者带来了困境：要么我们必须修改或放弃可想象性原则，要么拒绝对谓词的联想说明，要么承认休谟面临着他无法解决的困难。