This paper aims at contributing to a better understanding of the conditions of self-enforcing democracy by analyzing the recent wave of autocratic transitions. Based on a game-theoretic framework, we work out the conditions under which governments may induce the diverse public authorities to coordinate on extra-constitutional activities, eventually transforming the politico-institutional setting into one of autocratic rule. We find three empirically testable characteristics that promote this coordination process, namely: populism and public support, corruption, and a lack in the separation of powers. By contrast, low degrees of corruption and strongly separated powers can be viewed as prerequisites to self-enforcing democracy.

本文旨在通过分析最近的专制转型浪潮，有助于更好地理解自我执行型民主的条件。基于博弈论框架，我们制定了政府可以诱导不同公共当局在宪法外活动上进行协调的条件，最终将政治制度环境转变为专制统治。我们发现了促进这一协调过程的三个可实证检验的特征，即：民粹主义和公众支持、腐败和缺乏三权分立。相比之下，低程度的腐败和高度分权的权力可以被视为自我执行民主的先决条件。