Abstract

There is an alternative to the type of moral standing that hypothetically supervenes on other, base or subvenient, properties. Attributed moral standing results when people who have a naturally selected belief that they are worthy of moral consideration negotiate with others with the aim of being acknowledged as having moral standing and are successful. They could successfully negotiate with people who possessed supervenient moral standing. In a hypothetical evolutionary competition with the latter, they would replace them entirely. The result would be a moral community that excludes animals but that includes human infants. Membership in the moral community ends up being what it would be if moral standing supervened on the property of being human. The supervenience doctrine is also criticized on other grounds.

摘要

除了假设地附加在其他基础或次要属性上的道德地位类型之外，还有另一种选择。当人们自然选择相信他们值得道德考虑时，归因于道德地位的结果是与他人谈判以被承认具有道德地位并取得成功。他们可以成功地与具有超然道德地位的人谈判。在与后者的假设进化竞争中，它们将完全取代它们。结果将是一个排除动物但包括人类婴儿的道德社区。如果道德地位凌驾于人类的财产之上，那么道德共同体中的成员身份最终会变成这样。附带学说也因其他理由而受到批评。