This paper provides a new theoretical justification for entry to raise incumbent’s profit. In an industry with product differentiation and when firms use different strategic variables, we show that entry by an additional price setter may end up benefitting another price setting incumbent. This is due to the response of existing quantity setters, who contract their output after entry. Such reduction in output, which creates demand for the price setters, may more than compensate the reduction in price that is brought about by entry, provided that the products are not sufficiently differentiated.

中文翻译：

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混合行为下的盈利进入

本文为进入以提高在位者利润提供了新的理论依据。在一个产品差异化的行业中，当公司使用不同的战略变量时，我们表明，额外的定价者进入可能最终会使另一个定价者受益。这是由于现有数量设定者的反应，他们在输入后收缩其输出。如果产品没有充分差异化，这种为价格制定者创造需求的产量减少可能会超过补偿因进入而导致的价格下降。