Turkey has always assigned important powers to the legislature, establishing a strong parliamentary tradition. This also applies to the treaty-making process of the state. However, in 2017, the governmental structure was changed from a parliamentary system into a presidential one. This article examines the implications of this transformation on national rules concerning the ratification/termination of treaties, with special emphasis on the withdrawal decision of Turkey from the Istanbul Convention. It is first argued that the new system empowers the president on his/her own to put the Republic under international obligations without assuming political responsibility. It is then argued that the withdrawal decision is unconstitutional, demonstrating that the expansion, without checks and balances, of presidential powers may result in the arbitrary application of the domestic principles of treaty termination. The validity of the decision under the VCLT is also discussed. It is concluded that international law has its limits in intervening in cases of violations of national rules concerning the termination of treaties. It is finally argued that the attribution of all competences concerning the various stages of treaty-making to only one person may have consequences on invalidity claims that Turkey may raise concerning its consent to be bound by treaties.

中文翻译：

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新总统制对土耳其缔约实践的法律影响

土耳其历来赋予立法机关重要权力，建立了强大的议会传统。这也适用于国家的条约制定过程。然而，在 2017 年，政府结构从议会制转变为总统制。本文研究了这种转变对有关批准/终止条约的国家规则的影响，特别强调了土耳其退出《伊斯坦布尔公约》的决定。首先有人认为，新制度授权总统独自将共和国置于国际义务之下，而无需承担政治责任。然后有人争辩说，退出决定是违宪的，这表明扩张，没有制衡，总统权力可能导致任意适用终止条约的国内原则。还讨论了 VCLT 下决定的有效性。得出的结论是，国际法在干预违反有关终止条约的国家规则的案件方面有其局限性。最后有人认为，将与条约制定的各个阶段有关的所有权限仅归于一个人可能会对土耳其可能就其同意受条约约束提出的无效主张产生影响。