I distinguish two ways an ability might be general: (i) an ability might be general in that its possession doesn't entail the possession of an opportunity; (ii) an ability might be general in virtue of pertaining to a wide range of circumstances. I argue that these two types of generality – I refer to them with the terms ‘general’ and ‘generic’, respectively – produce two orthogonal distinctions among abilities. I show that the two types of generality are sometimes run together by those writing on free will and argue that both types of generality are relevant to understanding the modality of abilities.

中文翻译：

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关于一般能力和非一般能力

我区分两种能力可能是普遍的：（i）一种能力可能是普遍的，因为它的拥有并不意味着拥有机会；(ii) 一种能力可能由于适用于范围广泛的情况而具有普遍性。我认为这两种普遍性——我分别用术语“一般”和“一般”来指代它们——在能力之间产生了两种正交的区别。我展示了这两种类型的普遍性有时会被那些写自由意志的人放在一起，并论证这两种类型的普遍性都与理解能力的形式有关。