Recently, some philosophers have argued that friendship demands that we have positive beliefs about our friends even when such beliefs go against the evidence. Call this the doxastic account of the cognitive demands of friendship. I consider both motivations and worries for the doxastic account before developing a new account: the attentional account. According to it, friendship places demands on how we direct our attention. I argue that the attentional account accommodates the considerations that motivate the doxastic account and weathers the worries that trouble it. Along the way, I question the assumption that friendship's cognitive demands center on positivity.

中文翻译：

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友谊的认知需求

最近，一些哲学家认为，友谊要求我们对朋友抱有积极的信念，即使这种信念与证据相悖。将此称为对友谊认知需求的信念说明。在开发一个新账户：注意力账户之前，我考虑了对 doxastic 账户的动机和担忧。据此，友谊对我们如何引导注意力提出了要求。我认为注意力账户包含了激发信念账户的考虑因素并经受住了困扰它的担忧。一路上，我质疑友谊的认知需求以积极性为中心的假设。