ABSTRACT

This paper investigates from a phenomenological perspective the origins of self-illness ambiguity. Drawing on phenomenological theories of affectivity and selfhood, I argue that, as a phenomenon which concerns primarily the ‘personal self’, self-illness ambiguity is dependent on distinct alterations of affective background orientations. I start by illustrating how personhood is anchored in the experience of a specific set of non-intentional affects – i.e. moods or existential feelings – alterations of which are often present in mental ill-health. Also through the exploration of the phenomenology of acute and long-term anxiety, I suggest that self-illness ambiguity originates in the presence of moods or existential feelings that are in tension with the ones that structure the person’s experience prior to the onset of the illness or when its symptoms are not experienced. More specifically, I claim that due to their ability to ‘block’ or ‘suspend’ some of the person’s affective and cognitive responses, such affective orientations may unsettle one’s self-defining evaluative perspective, leading to uncertainty and doubting about one’s personal self.

摘要

本文从现象学的角度探讨了自我疾病模糊性的起源。借鉴情感和自我的现象学理论，我认为，作为一种主要关注“个人自我”的现象，自我疾病的模糊性取决于情感背景取向的明显变化。我首先说明人格如何锚定在一组特定的非故意影响的体验中——即情绪或存在感– 精神疾病中经常出现这些变化。同样通过对急性和长期焦虑现象学的探索，我认为自我疾病的模糊性起源于情绪或存在感的存在，这些情绪或存在感与构成疾病发作前的人经历的情绪或存在感存在紧张关系。或者当它的症状没有出现时。更具体地说，我声称由于他们“阻止”或“暂停”某人的某些情感和认知反应的能力，这种情感取向可能会动摇一个人的自我定义评估观点，导致不确定性和怀疑一个人的个人自我。