The right to legal capacity (Article 12) is the most contested realization of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). If implemented, it would revolutionize the position of persons with psychosocial disabilities, intellectual disabilities and other cognitive conditions. Yet its implementation has been hindered by conceptual misunderstandings and a lack of distinction between the key questions in the debate. This contribution first demonstrates that advocates and opponents apply ‘substitute decision-making’ and ‘legal capacity’ differently, leading to different expectations. Second, it substantiates that once all the concepts are understood correctly, three distinct questions underpin the interpretation of Article 12 CRPD: (1) What makes a person’s will reliable? (2) What is good support? and (3) How can such a reliable will be diverged from, given other interests? Instead of giving the answers, this contribution brings consistency to the debate and proposes a pathways for a future approach to legal capacity.

中文翻译：

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法律行为能力的普遍权利——消除阴霾

具有法律行为能力的权利（第 12 条）是《联合国残疾人权利公约》（CRPD）中最具争议的实现。如果实施，它将彻底改变心理障碍、智力障碍和其他认知障碍者的地位。然而，由于概念上的误解和辩论中的关键问题缺乏区分，它的实施受到了阻碍。这一贡献首先表明，拥护者和反对者对“替代决策”和“法律能力”的应用不同，导致了不同的期望。其次，它证实，一旦正确理解所有概念，三个不同的问题将成为对《残疾人权利公约》第 12 条解释的基础：(1) 什么使一个人的意志可靠？(2) 什么是好的支撑？(3) 考虑到其他利益，这种可靠的将如何偏离？这篇文章没有给出答案，而是为辩论带来了一致性，并为未来的法律行为能力提出了一条途径。