This essay assesses the account of truth presented in Wiggins's 2002 paper ‘An indefinibilist cum normative view of truth and the marks of truth'. I agree with Wiggins that we should seek, not to define truth, but to elucidate it by unfolding its connections with other basic notions. However, I give reasons for preferring an elucidation based on Ramsey's account of truth to Wiggins's Tarski-inspired approach. I also cast doubt on Wiggins's thesis that convergence is a mark of truth, arguing instead that a claim which is up for assessment as true or false must be one to which different speakers/hearers can attach, and know that they are attaching, the same sense. I use this principle to rule out an account of indicative conditionals, and bring (albeit inconclusively) some considerations to bear on the question of whether those conditionals have truth values. An appendix revisits a debate about the determinateness of distinctness.

这篇文章评估了威金斯 2002 年的论文“真理的不可定义性兼规范性观点和真理的标记”中提出的对真理的描述。我同意威金斯的观点，我们应该寻求的不是定义真理，而是通过展开它与其他基本概念的联系来阐明它。然而，我给出了更喜欢基于拉姆齐对真理的解释而不是威金斯受塔斯基启发的方法的解释的理由。我还对 Wiggins 的论点表示怀疑，即趋同是真理的标志，相反，我认为可以评估为真或假的主张必须是不同的说话者/听众可以附加的主张，并且知道他们正在附加，相同感觉。我使用这个原则来排除指示性条件的说明，并就这些条件句是否具有真值的问题提出一些考虑（尽管尚无定论）。附录重新审视了关于独特性确定性的辩论。