Voters are frequently ill-equipped to monitor politicians’ actions. Politicians are expected to implement projects, whose benefits sometimes partially accrue to interest groups (IGs) and not entirely to voters. IGs thus have an incentive to affect which projects politicians implement by providing implementation subsidies to lower the cost of policymaking that politicians incur. This article shows how these considerations interact in a two-period political agency model with moral hazard and adverse selection. I study how the involvement of IGs in the policymaking process can affect voters’ welfare and show why voters might rationally not perfectly monitor politicians in the presence of IGs that might capture projects’ benefits and affect policymaking. (JEL D72, D73, D83)

中文翻译：

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监督不完善的政治机构和执行补贴

选民经常没有能力监督政客的行动。预计政治家将实施项目，其利益有时会部分归于利益集团 (IG)，而不是全部归于选民。因此，IG 有动机通过提供实施补贴来影响政客实施哪些项目，以降低政客的决策成本。本文展示了这些考虑如何在具有道德风险和逆向选择的两期政治代理模型中相互作用。我研究了 IG 在决策过程中的参与如何影响选民的福利，并说明为什么在可能获取项目利益并影响政策制定的 IG 存在的情况下，选民可能不会理性地完全监督政治家。(JEL D72, D73, D83)