Much has been said theoretically about whether populism corrects the limitations of democracies, or instead damages their foundations. Yet we still know very little about how populist governments affect democratic policymaking in practice. Taking the classic policy cycle approach as a heuristic device, this article analyzes how populists influence agenda-setting, policy formulation and design, implementation, evaluation, and termination processes. Using a variety of sources, the article provides a qualitative in-depth analysis of the Mexican case during the first half of president Andrés-Manuel López-Obrador administration. The article shows that a populist government may fulfill some of its promises, but it ultimately materializes most of its perils, causing significant policy, institutional, and social damage. Populists introduce important distortions in each one of the policy stages and thus alter considerably the policymaking processes usually associated with democratic regimes. They employ a variety of strategies to limit the number of policy actors taking part in agenda-setting and evaluation exercises; formulate ineffective policy tools based on questionable design assumptions; develop personalistic implementation channels prone to patronage and clientelism; undermine the value of evidence-based analyses and discussions; and terminate institutions and programs on a discretionary basis. By exerting a rhetorical monopoly over the ‘will of the people,’ populists can follow policymaking patterns that significantly depart from the technical, rational, and pluralistic standards commonly associated with democratic policymaking. The article brings together debates on populism and policymaking, and studies a national case which has received limited scholarly attention, thus adding to both our theoretical and empirical contemporary understanding on this subject.

关于民粹主义是纠正民主的局限性，还是破坏民主的基础，理论上已经有很多说法。然而，我们对民粹主义政府如何在实践中影响民主决策知之甚少。本文将经典的政策周期方法作为启发式工具，分析民粹主义者如何影响议程设置、政策制定和设计、实施、评估和终止过程。本文使用各种来源，对安德烈斯-曼努埃尔洛佩斯-奥夫拉多尔总统执政前半期的墨西哥案例进行了定性深入分析。文章表明，民粹主义政府可能会履行其部分承诺，但最终会实现其大部分危险，造成重大的政策、制度和社会损害。民粹主义者在每个政策阶段都引入了重要的扭曲，从而大大改变了通常与民主政体相关的决策过程。他们采用各种策略来限制参与议程设置和评估活动的政策参与者的数量；根据有问题的设计假设制定无效的政策工具；开发倾向于光顾和客户主义的个性化实施渠道；破坏循证分析和讨论的价值；并酌情终止机构和项目。通过对“人民意志”施加修辞垄断，民粹主义者可以遵循明显偏离通常与民主决策相关的技术、理性和多元标准的决策模式。