Class hegemony and resource dependence are the traditional perspectives used to explain interlocking directorate formation in publicly listed corporations. A subset of these corporations, family firms, are different because their governance involves non-economic interests. There are few empirical validations of these perspectives for family firms. Through a 16 semi-annual period longitudinal comparison of non-financial family and non-family Italian firms, we show that the traditional perspectives partially explain board formation in family businesses while other considerations such as family ties provide a more complete picture. Over the same period, we find that family and non-family firm interlocks evolve differently, suggesting refinements on theories of board interlocks for family firms.

阶级霸权和资源依赖是用来解释上市公司连锁董事会形成的传统观点。这些公司的一个子集，即家族企业，是不同的，因为它们的治理涉及非经济利益。这些观点对家族企业的实证验证很少。通过对非金融家族企业和非家族意大利企业的 16 个半年度纵向比较，我们表明传统观点部分解释了家族企业中的董事会形成，而家族关系等其他考虑因素提供了更完整的画面。在同一时期，我们发现家族企业和非家族企业联锁的演变不同，这表明对家族企业董事会联锁理论的改进。