This article tests for regulation-induced adverse selection in the Massachusetts automobile insurance market during the 1990–2004 period of fix-and-establish rate regulation. We demonstrate the application of the test for adverse selection in Finkelstein and Poterba (Journal of Risk and Insurance 81 (4):709–34, 2014) to a regulated insurance market using group-level panel data on purchase amounts and loss costs. Differences between rates that incorporate state-mandated restrictions and those based on actuarial estimates provide a proxy for the unused observables needed to implement the test. Consistent with regulation-induced adverse selection, proxy values indicating higher unpriced risk are statistically significant and positively related to both insurance purchases and loss costs.

本文测试了 1990 年至 2004 年固定利率监管期间马萨诸塞州汽车保险市场中监管引起的逆向选择。我们使用有关购买金额和损失成本的集团级面板数据，展示了 Finkelstein 和 Poterba（ Journal of Risk and Insurance 81 (4):709–34, 2014）中逆向选择测试在受监管保险市场中的应用。包含国家强制限制的比率与基于精算估计的比率之间的差异为实施测试所需的未使用的可观察量提供了代理。与监管引起的逆向选择一致，表明未定价风险较高的代理值在统计上具有显着性，并且与保险购买和损失成本呈正相关。