Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of managerial myopia on information technology (IT) investment. Specifically, it aims to investigate the influence of chief information officer (CIO) compensation on IT investment and the moderating role of the board monitoring strength on this relationship.

Design/methodology/approach

The study examines a sample of 194 firms listed on US stock exchanges with a CIO position in 2019. The authors employ hierarchical regression analysis to test the hypothesis.

Findings

The results show that CIO compensation negatively influences IT investment. Further, even though vigilant board monitoring does not necessarily reduce such opportunistic behaviors, weak board monitoring creates an environment for such actions.

Research limitations/implications

First, the cross-sectional data can limit the results' generalizability. Second, the sampling frame is not perfectly random as it consists of firms that have CIO compensation information in the ExecuComp for 2019. Third, we include only two measures of board monitoring strength.

Practical implications

Board of directors should wisely select compensation packages' components since equity incentives potentially exacerbate managerial myopia. Moreover, firms may regulate CIOs' investment behaviors through board-level IT governance.

Originality/value

This study is one of the few studies that utilize CIO sensitivity to measure CIO compensation. Moreover, by examining the factors affecting IT investment behavior, this study sheds light on CIO incentives' impact on IT investment behaviors. Finally, to the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study to investigate board monitoring's role in the relationship between CIO sensitivity and IT investment intensity.

中文翻译：

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CIO股权薪酬与IT投资：董事会监督的调节作用与管理层短视的证据

目的

本文的目的是探讨管理短视对信息技术 (IT) 投资的影响。具体来说，旨在调查首席信息官（CIO）薪酬对IT投资的影响以及董事会监控强度对此关系的调节作用。

设计/方法论/途径

该研究以 2019 年在美国证券交易所上市的 194 家拥有 CIO 职位的公司为样本。作者采用层次回归分析来检验这一假设。

发现

结果表明，CIO 薪酬对 IT 投资产生负面影响。此外，尽管警惕的董事会监控不一定会减少这种机会主义行为，但薄弱的董事会监控为此类行为创造了环境。

研究局限性/影响

首先，横截面数据会限制结果的普遍性。其次，抽样框架并不是完全随机的，因为它由在 2019 年 ExecuComp 中拥有 CIO 薪酬信息的公司组成。第三，我们仅包含两项董事会监控强度的衡量标准。

实际影响

董事会应明智地选择薪酬方案的组成部分，因为股权激励可能会加剧管理层的短视。此外，公司可以通过董事会级别的IT治理来规范CIO的投资行为。

原创性/价值

这项研究是利用 CIO 敏感性来衡量 CIO 薪酬的少数研究之一。此外，通过考察影响IT投资行为的因素，本研究揭示了CIO激励对IT投资行为的影响。最后，据作者所知，这是第一项调查董事会监控在 CIO 敏感性与 IT 投资强度之间关系中的作用的研究。