This paper expounds and defends a relational egalitarian account of the moral wrongfulness of vote markets according to which such markets are incompatible with our relating to one another as equals qua people with views on what we should collectively decide. Two features of this account are especially interesting. First, it shows why vote markets are objectionable even in cases where standard objections to them, such as the complaint that they result in inequality in opportunity for political influence across rich and poor people, are inapplicable. Second, it specifies the sense in which, politically speaking, we should relate as equals, and in doing provides a richer version of recent relational egalitarian accounts of the ideal of democracy.

本文阐述并捍卫了一种对投票市场道德不法性的关系平等主义解释，根据这种解释，这种市场与我们作为对我们应该集体决定的观点有看法的人之间的平等关系是不相容的。这个帐户有两个特点特别有趣。首先，它表明了为什么投票市场会令人反感，即使在对投票市场的标准反对意见（例如抱怨投票市场导致富人和穷人之间政治影响力机会不平等）不适用的情况下也是如此。其次，它明确了从政治上讲我们应该平等地交往的意义，并在这样做时为最近的关系平等主义对民主理想的描述提供了更丰富的版本。