This study examines how industry tournament incentives affect chief executive officers' (CEOs') attitudes toward differential risk-taking. The results show that these incentives cause a greater increase in taking systematic rather than idiosyncratic risks. Furthermore, this differential risk-taking manifests in a competitive business environment. The findings hold robust to the instrumental variable approach and variation in industry pay gap following the adoption of FAS123R. Overall, the results suggest that the industry pay gap effectively increases CEOs' systematic risk-taking, especially in competitive industries.

中文翻译：

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行业锦标赛激励和差异化风险承担

本研究探讨了行业锦标赛激励措施如何影响首席执行官 (CEO) 对差别风险承担的态度。结果表明，这些激励措施会导致系统性风险而非特殊风险的增加。此外，这种差异化的风险承担在竞争激烈的商业环境中也有所体现。研究结果对工具变量方法和采用 FAS123R 后行业薪酬差距的变化是有效的。总体而言，结果表明，行业薪酬差距有效地增加了首席执行官的系统性风险承担，尤其是在竞争性行业。