ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the repercussions of remarks made by Duncan Sandys, the British Minister of Defence, at a press conference held in Canberra in August 1957 which suggested that British nuclear weapons were going to be deployed to airbases in Malaya. Against the background of the negotiations that had led to the Anglo-Malayan defence agreement, and with Malaya on the cusp of independence, an intense debate took place between Whitehall officials over whether and what form of assurances over consultation should be given to Malaya’s new leaders over the deployment of nuclear weapons and the use of Malayan bases. Besides examining why and how such assurances were issued, this article seeks to demonstrate the tensions produced by British defence policy in South East Asia during this period, which was increasingly rooted in alliance obligations to SEATO and the consequent projection of nuclear capabilities, as they began to conflict with the political imperative to bolster the post-independence United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) Alliance government in Malaya. It also brings forward some of the links and connections that can be made between nuclear issues and the dynamics of decolonisation.

摘要

本文重点关注英国国防部长邓肯·桑迪斯 (Duncan Sandys) 在 1957 年 8 月于堪培拉举行的新闻发布会上暗示英国核武器将部署到马来亚空军基地的言论所产生的影响。在促成英马防务协议谈判的背景下，以及马来亚处于独立的风口浪尖上，白厅官员之间就是否应该向马来亚新领导人提供协商保证以及以何种形式提供保证进行了激烈辩论部署核武器和使用马来亚基地。除了研究为什么以及如何发布此类保证外，本文还试图证明这一时期英国在东南亚的国防政策所产生的紧张局势，这越来越植根于对 SEATO 的联盟义务以及随之而来的核能力投射，因为它们开始与支持马来亚独立后的马来民族团结组织 (UMNO) 联盟政府的政治需要发生冲突。它还提出了核问题与非殖民化动态之间可以建立的一些联系和联系。