We study revenue, entry, and possible collusion outcomes in the Chilean fishery with the longest record of individual transferable share quotas allocated via public auctions. We examine 18 annual multi-object auctions and two different auction designs at work. Based on results from a numerically calibrated auction model and econometric estimates, we claim that the repeated use of sequential oral (multiunit) auctions was particularly prone to bid rigging and facilitated entry deterrence. Yet, efficient entry was possible thanks to fully transferable quota rights. We highlight two conclusions from these results: First, when selling multiple production rights in a highly concentrated industry repeatedly over time, auctioneers should avoid using sequential, English auctions. Second, transferable production rights help overcome inefficiencies that can arise from design flaws in the chosen mechanism for allocating these rights.

中文翻译：

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ITQ重复多单元拍卖中的进入威慑和串通

我们研究智利渔业中的收入、进入和可能的串通结果，该渔业拥有通过公开拍卖分配的个人可转让份额配额的最长记录。我们研究了 18 次年度多件拍卖和两种不同的拍卖设计。基于数字校准拍卖模型和计量经济学估计的结果，我们声称重复使用顺序口头（多单元）拍卖特别容易出现操纵投标并促进进入威慑。然而，由于完全可转让的配额权，有效的进入成为可能。我们从这些结果中强调了两个结论：首先，当随着时间的推移在高度集中的行业中反复出售多个生产权时，拍卖师应避免使用连续的英式拍卖。第二，