The normative vocabulary of republican political theory can be fruitfully applied to evaluate the phases of market turbulence in sovereign debt markets witnessed during the Eurozone crisis. A view of justice that requires the minimisation of dominating relationships between agents highlights how the institutional preconditions of undominated sovereignty were lacking in the Eurozone. The agreed-upon structure within which countries operated fuelled self-fulfilling market movements in sovereign bond markets, which bear the hallmark of unjust domination as weaker Member States formed a social relationship with investors over which they did not have meaningful control. In motivating the thesis, the paper touches upon the recent debates on the sources and site of domination and on the stance, republican scholars should take toward competitive markets. Given this diagnosis, Eurozone countries have an obligation to establish supranational institutions that increase private and public channels of risk-sharing.

共和政治理论的规范词汇可以有效地应用于评估欧元区危机期间主权债务市场的市场动荡阶段。要求代理人之间的支配关系最小化的正义观强调了欧元区如何缺乏不受支配的主权的制度先决条件。各国在其中运作的商定结构助长了主权债券市场的自我实现市场运动，主权债券市场具有不公正统治的特点，因为较弱的成员国与投资者形成了一种他们没有有意义控制的社会关系。为了激发论文的动机，本文触及了最近关于统治的来源和地点的争论，以及共和派学者应该对竞争市场采取的立场。