Individual transferable quota (ITQ) regimes have been adopted in a number of fisheries. While the issue of market power in such regimes has been discussed, this paper contributes to the literature by solving for explicit expressions for harvesting, quota price, and efficiency loss. In addition to supporting the previous findings, the explicit solution indicates that the cost of the market leader in relation to the fringe, as well as the size of the fringe, affects the magnitude of the efficiency loss. Inspired by the Norwegian Northeast Arctic cod fishery, the paper is among the first to provide a numerical illustration of the efficiency loss of market power in a rights-based regime for fisheries. The model is simulated for two cost functions, wherein one allows for exit from the fishery. The numerical results support the theoretical findings and indicate that generally, the efficiency loss of the market power is small.

中文翻译：

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ITQ、市场力量和效率损失

许多渔业采用了单独的可转让配额（ITQ）制度。虽然已经讨论了此类制度中的市场力量问题，但本文通过解决收获、配额价格和效率损失的明确表达，为文献做出了贡献。除了支持先前的研究结果外，显式解决方案还表明市场领导者与边缘相关的成本以及边缘的大小会影响效率损失的幅度。受挪威东北北极鳕鱼渔业的启发，该论文首次提供了基于权利的渔业制度中市场力量效率损失的数字说明。该模型针对两个成本函数进行了模拟，其中一个允许退出渔业。